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Professor Katz's Study of
Human Relationships
Dean M. Hashimoto and Mark E. Haddad
Through his scholarship and teaching, Jay Katz has
sought to lead a world prone to silence toward ques-
tions, conversation, contemplation, and then more ques-
tions. "What I attempted to accomplish during my life
as a teacher of law and medicine," Professor Katz re-
cently remarked, "can be simply stated: to raise
questions."' Why, above all, questions? "If one wishes
to find answers that transcend the moment," Professor
Katz explains, "one must first relentlessly search for the
right questions. '
Professor Katz's scholarship reflects the rich rewards
of his lifetime search for the right questions. In each of
the major areas that he has examined-medical treat-
ment and decision-making, catastrophic diseases, family
and society, psychiatry and law, and experimentation
with human beings-his probing questions have un-
earthed unnoticed issues, exposed preconceptions, and
redefined the parameters of debate. We will not attempt
to summarize all of his contributions to these areas.
Such an effort would take more space than is available
here, and would be fundamentally misguided, as the
impact of new questions, unlike that of proposed an-
swers, has an enduring and generative quality not easily
canvassed.
We propose instead to isolate certain recurring
themes in Professor Katz's work, and to discuss them
within some of the notable contexts in which he has
developed them. His work reflects, at the broadest level,
a profound concern for the ways in which human beings
come to know themselves and come to treat each other.
Within this context, Professor Katz has sought to ex-
plore the implications for law, medicine, and public pol-
icy of a commitment to psychoanalytic theory and to
enhancing the capacity of human beings for self-
awareness and self-determination. He has identified and
confronted complex tensions between authority and in-
dividual freedom, between self-determination and pater-
nalism, and between psychological autonomy and de-
pendence on irrationality and the unconscious. He has
not only resisted recourse to simple "solutions" but has
identified the hidden assumptions and confusions that
render such solutions untenable. We come away from
his work persuaded that solutions, if they exist, lie in
acceptance of the struggle for greater awareness of hu-
man motivations, and in the realization that real prog-
ress in that struggle can come only through collabora-
tion with others.
The foundation for his study of human relationships
and views of psychological autonomy lies in psychiatry
and in psychoanalysis. His second casebook, Psycho-
analysis, Psychiatry, and Law, 3 identifies some of the
important questions that psychoanalysis raises for law
about human nature and motivation. The casebook con-
tains a wide range of materials designed to facilitate
examination of whether lawyers should "search for a
psychological image of man,"' 4 what are the compo-
nents and assumptions behind such an image, and, in
particular, what is the nature of the psychoanalytic the-
ory of the human mind. In turning sustained attention to
the relevance of psychoanalytic theory and questions for
legal study, Professor Katz laid the groundwork for fu-
ture studies at the intersection of law and psychiatry.
The importance of psychoanalytic theory for Profes-
sor Katz is apparent in his early writing on the problem
of determining whether the state may treat a person
deemed mentally ill against his or her will. 5 This prob-
lem starkly poses the value of individual autonomy
against society's paternal desire to provide unwanted
treatment that it feels is in the individual's best interest.
Professor Katz's analysis of this issue foreshadows the
more extended attention he would give to the general
problem of disclosure and consent in all physician/
patient encounters.
In sorting out the implications of positing a duty of
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individuals to submit to treatment for mental illness,
Professor Katz realized that simply recognizing the im-
portance of protecting individual autonomy, and
thereby concluding the debate with the proposition that
"persons should be left to pursue their own fate if they
if they so 'state' "6 would not provide an adequate so-
lution to the problem. In his view:
Such a proposition can be as destructive of human
life as its opposite of overreadiness to hospitalize.
It is more difficult to pursue a middle ground,
which seeks to take into account the complexities
of conscious and unconscious dynamics and at the
same time attempts to keep such judgments from
running wild, but it is truer to the realities of hu-
man existence and aspirations. It is always easier
to cut than untie Gordian Knots.
In this case, the Gordian Knot is the complex of
conscious and unconscious motivations inherent in the
psychoanalytic image of human beings. A decision
maker who defers completely and exclusively to the con-
scious messages of a patient risks abandoning the very
individual he or she is seeking to respect. As Professor
Katz explains:
[S]trict limitation of the right to treatment to those
who from the outset consciously ask for therapy
must be evaluated against the reality of psychologi-
cal behavior. Man may consciously seek one solu-
tion to his problems and unconsciously hope for
another. It is not rare to observe such conflicts in a
person which preclude his asking for treatment;
yet once it is imposed, he readily or gradually ac-
cepts. The dangers inherent in acting on behalf of
others from inferences about non-conscious wishes
are great. Yet, if these wishes are disregarded or
rejected by preferring to act only on conscious
messages, equally important non-conscious mes-
sages will be left unacknowledged. Thus a decision
to listen to non-conscious voices can lead to an
abuse of power, while a decision to heed only con-
scious voices can abandon persons to an unwished
fate. It is a dilemma for which there are no easy
solutions.
7
A recognition of the "reality of psychological
behavior" thus leads Professor Katz to approve of co-
ercion, although only in narrowly defined circum-
stances. "Without coercion, society will abandon many
people to their self-destructive and uncared-for fate.
Such an approach is as insensitive as the abuse of power
that leads to ... indefinite incarceration without treat-
ment . .,8
In The Silent World of Doctor and Patient, Professor
Katz refines the concept of autonomy to reflect the con-
cerns just discussed, and he thereby brings the questions
and insights of psychoanalytic and legal theory power-
fully to bear on the relations between doctor and pa-
tient. He argues that doctors must relinquish their tra-
ditional view that they know and have an obligation to
decide what treatment is best for their patients. This
view, according to Professor Katz, is based on the
flawed assumptions that patients do not want to partic-
ipate in making decisions about their treatment and that
patients lack the capacity to make good decisions; such
a view is also based on the unexamined wishes of phy-
sicians to protect the position of power and authority
they currently enjoy.
By turning our attention to the psychology of doctor/
patient encounters, and by refining the concept of au-
tonomy, Professor Katz exposes the flaws in these as-
sumptions. He begins by breaking the concept of auton-
omy into two basic parts, "rights" and "capacities." He
distinguishes the right of self-determination, which he
defines as "the right of individuals to make their own
decisions without interference from others," from "psy-
chological autonomy," which "speaks to persons' ca-
pacities to reflect about contemplated choices and to
make choices." 9
In deciding whether and to what extent a patient's
right to self-determination must be respected, Professor
Katz urges us to recognize that patients' capacities to
choose may be enhanced through introspection and con-
versation. It is here that psychoanalytic considerations
become crucial. Professor Katz asks us to acknowledge
that unconscious and irrational motivations exist, and
that they may influence our conscious expressions of
preference and choice in ways of which we are unaware.
A patient's apparent willingness to cede all authority to
the doctor, though consciously expressed, may reflect
nothing more than an instinctive regression to child-
hood and projection onto the doctor of unrealistic hopes
and fears rooted in early childhood memories. Yet these
patients/children are, in fact, adults and, Professor Katz
argues, have the capacity to respond to their illness as
adults if doctors attempt to facilitate such a response by
refusing, at least initially, to take sole responsibility for
making treatment decisions.
Professor Katz therefore would impose a duty on
physicians to engage patients in conversation about
their illness and the range of treatment options available
to them. He acknowledges that there is an element of
paternalism, even coercion, in insisting that such con-
versations take place. He defends this coercion, how-
ever, by pointing out that conversation is an essential
pre-requisite to enhanced psychological autonomy, and
thus to meaningful self-determination. Such conversa-
tion is also essential if physicians are to avoid imposing,
however unwittingly, their own value preferences on pa-
tients.
Professor Katz believes that if physicians are to con-
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verse candidly with patients they must reveal the uncer-
tainty inherent in the clinical practice of medicine. This
uncertainty of knowledge is due to limitations of the
medical profession's current knowledge, the individual
physician's incomplete mastery of available knowledge,
and his or her difficulty in distinguishing between per-
sonal ignorance and the limitations of available
information.'" Twentieth-century clinical medicine
adopted the scientific method, which has proved to be a
powerful means of dissipating our profound ignorance
about human health and pathology. Professor Katz
rightly contends that this potential for greater clarity of
what is known and unknown makes it imperative for
physicians to clarify for patients and themselves the ex-
tent of the underlying uncertainty in their therapeutic
advice. "
The traditional justification for not discussing the
subject of uncertainty is based on the patient's incapac-
ity to comprehend abstruse information and the pa-
tient's possible intolerance to intimations about uncer-
tainty. Professor Katz persuasively argues, however,
that this traditional focus on the patient's incapacity and
intolerance for uncertainty is misplaced. He observes:
[I]t must be recognized that, in physician-patient
interactions, professionals' defenses against igno-
rance and uncertainty are a greater problem than
patients' ignorance .... Patients' supposed intoler-
ance of medical uncertainties may thus turn out to
be a reflection less of an inherent incapacity to live
with this tragic fact and more of an identification
with the perceived incapacity of physicians to live
with it. Patients' supposed intolerance may turn
out to be significantly affected by a projection of
physicians' intolerance onto patients.'
2
Because of physicians' scientific training and their
consultations with their colleagues, Professor Katz be-
lieves that physicians are consciously aware of their un-
certainty of knowledge. When physicians collaborate
among themselves, they freely discuss the limitations in
the interpretations and applications of empirical studies
to their clinical work. During conversations with pa-
tients, however, their psychological response is an un-
conscious denial and habitual suppression of this aware-
ness in order to make matters "seem clearer, more un-
derstandable, and more certain than they are; it makes
action possible."' 3 Professor Katz further observes:
Human beings' defensive and adaptive needs to
make both their internal and external worlds intel-
ligible, to shun incomprehensibility, doubt, and
uncertainty, are formidable. In dreams, it is the
simultaneous presence of contradictory, "absurd"
and irrational unconscious thoughts and of more
accustomed rational thoughts-all of which make
up the content of dreams-that is largely denied.
Witnesses to accidents defend against the faulty
nature of their external sense perceptions. Both
examples illustrate the pervasive and fateful human
need to remain in control over one's internal and
external worlds by seemingly understanding them,
even at the expense of falsifying the data.'
4
Thus the unconscious denial and habitual suppression
of knowledge of uncertainty by physicians leads to an
exaggerated projection of certainty in their conversa-
tions with patients and, ironically, leaves patients in a
state of greater uncertainty due to the lack of candor.' 5
Furthermore, this denial and suppression creates a hid-
den pressure favoring medical intervention, sometimes
in the forms of unnecessary surgeries and secret pre-
scriptions of placebos.
After making these psychoanalytic observations,
Professor Katz asks a new question, which in fact chal-
lenges the medical profession: "Can hope and reassur-
ance be offered to patients without resorting to decep-
tion and without inviting disappointment?"' 6 Professor
Katz holds the conviction that a patient's faith in a phy-
sician should be premised on a realistic appraisal of
medical uncertainties, rather than on a deceptive silence
that may lead to disappointment. He suggests that un-
certainty itself may aid physicians and patients if physi-
cians would be explicit about their uncertainty of
knowledge. A physician's willingness to expose uncer-
tainties is likely to lead to greater trust and intimacy
with patients. Because the physicians' disavowals of un-
certainty are the result of unconscious denial and habit-
ual suppression, however, the disclosure of medical un-
certainties could become incorporated into medical
practice and custom only through institutional changes
in physician training.
Looming in the background of all this questioning is
Dostoevsky's Grand Inquisitor. For Professor Katz, the
Grand Inquisitor embodies most dramatically the es-
sence of medicine's paternal/authoritarian world view.
The Grand Inquisitor argues that in the inevitable
"fearful moments of life," human beings will lack the
strength to "stick to the free decision of the heart," and
will turn instead to anyone, including charlatans, who
provides "miracle, mystery, and authority."' 7 The at-
traction of providing patients with miracle, mystery,
and authority has proved to be very great, and yet, as
Professor Katz pointedly observes, physicians' willing-
ness to provide such ascientific therapies tends to blur
the distinction between medicine and quackery.' 8 Ad-
herence to scientific practice means resisting the urge to
promise more than medicine can realistically deliver,
and speaking candidly with patients about what their
expectations should be. While such an approach may
drive some patients into the arms of quacks, it will serve
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to "reassure the vast majority of patients who remain in
their care that physicians will exercise only those skills
they truly possess. '" 9
Professor Katz has not limited his analyses of physi-
cian-patient relationships to those that occur in the stan-
dard clinical setting. He is also renowned for his pioneer
study of relationships between medical investigators and
subjects in human experimentations. This study ex-
plores the fundamental tension between the values of
freedom of scientific inquiry and individual autonomy.
In the introduction to his now classic casebook, Exper-
imentation With Human Beings, he defines the param-
eters of debate by describing this tension and asking a
question:
When science takes man as its subject, tensions
arise between two values basic to Western society:
freedom of scientific inquiry and protection of in-
dividual inviolability. Both are facets of man's
quest to order his world. Scientific research has
given man some, albeit incomplete, knowledge and
tools to tame his environment, while commitment
to individual worth and autonomy, however wa-
vering, has limited man's intrusions on man. Yet
when human beings become the subject of experi-
mentation, allegiance to one value invites neglect
of the other. At the heart of this conflict lies an
age-old question: When may a society, actively or
by acquiescence, expose some of its members to
harm in order to seek benefits for them, for others,
or for society as a whole?2"
Professor Katz himself conducted experiments with
human subjects on hypnotic dreams in the 1950's, and
his reflections on the limited disclosure made to the sub-
jects of these experiments stimulated much of his early
thinking in this area. Although he has repeatedly em-
phasized in his writings the value of freedom of scientific
inquiry,"' he has also insisted, in the face of much crit-
icism from his peers in medicine, that government must
exercise its authority to define and limit the human costs
it is willing to bear in order to advance knowledge.
While he acknowledges that medical research is mo-
tivated in large measure by altruism and scientific curi-
osity, Professor Katz reminds us that scientific investi-
gators are also influenced by other, less conscious mo-
tivations. He observes that a physician-investigator's
conscious willingness to care for patients is intertwined
with human proclivities for aggression. Professor Katz
explains that investigators are not only susceptible to
these proclivities, but "they are particularly vulnerable
to them because their dedication to the advancement of
science can blind them to the human costs of research.
Denials and rationalizations are powerful allies of
aggression." 22
His casebook documents in detail the dark side of
experimentation, including the Nazi experiments con-
ducted in the concentration camps, the 1932 Tuskegee
Syphilis Study that followed the natural history of un-
treated syphilis in subjects who were told that they were
getting free treatment, 23 and the 1963 experiment at the
Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital that involved the in-
jection of cancer cells into chronically ill patients with-
out obtaining their informed consent. Professor Katz
has helped us come to understand these experiments not
as aberrant acts of madness, but as the predictable re-
sults of the unchecked power of human aggression cam-
ouflaged in scientific garb. "We must remember," he
cautions, "that habet mundus iste suas noctes et non
paucas (this world has its nights and they are not few in
number)."14
Professor Katz has therefore proposed that govern-
ment regulation should ensure joint decision-making by
investigators and subjects:
Decision making in medicine ought to be a joint
undertaking and should depend more on the na-
ture and quality of the entire give-and-take process
than on whether a particular disclosure has or has
not been made. If decision making is viewed as a
joint undertaking, then investigators and subjects
have responsibilities both to themselves and to
each other. Then one person can neither
overpower the other, nor surrender responsibility
to the other (except under carefully defined cir-
cumstances), nor not feel responsible for the other.
One of the first questions ever raised-Am I my
brother's keeper?-has many intertwined answers:
Yes, I am my brother's keeper, and he is my
keeper, and I am my own keeper, and he is his
own keeper. Thus investigator and subject are both
each others' keepers and their own keepers.2 5
Professor Katz concedes that government regulation
that is aimed at ensuring joint decision-making may, to
some degree, inhibit scientific inquiry. He reminds us,
however, in the words of a colleague, that:
scientific progress is an optional goal, not an un-
conditional commitment .... [A] slower progress
in the conquest of disease would not threaten soci-
ety ... [but] society would indeed be threatened
by the erosion of those moral values whose loss,
possibly caused by too ruthless a pursuit of scien-
tific progress, would make its most dazzling tri-
umphs not worth having.6
Professor Katz, in collaboration with Professor Al-
exander Capron, critiqued the role of government reg-
ulation of health care in yet a different setting in their
book, Catastrophic Diseases: Who Decides What?
7
They portray the relationship between physician-
investigators and patient-subjects in the context of so-
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cial policies that determine the way in which scarce life-
saving resources are distributed. The question raised
throughout this book is: "Who will make the decisions
and by what means?,,2s Professors Katz and Capron
propose as an ideal an informed consent model, which
they describe as a "mutually informed joint working
relationship." The authors then examine the interac-
tions between this ideal model and relevant institutions,
including professional groups, government agencies,
and interested private institutions.
The Katz and Capron study of catastrophic diseases
is a groundbreaking contribution to medicolegal litera-
ture. Instead of merely detailing a comprehensive
scheme for catastrophic disease decision-making, the
authors sought to identify the relevant values and goals.
Professors Katz and Capron contend that decision-
making in the treatment of catastrophic diseases should
be a mutual and collaborative effort. They acknowledge
that the informed consent model must take into account
the unusual tensions that shape catastrophic disease de-
cision-making. Terminal patients often deny their con-
dition as a psychological defense. This defense, coupled
with feelings of helplessness, dependency and further
depression, may seriously interfere with the patient's
ability to make realistic decisions.29 Dying patients may
unconsciously express a too-eager willingness to be used
for scientific work in return for special favors that fa-
cilitate avoidance of the realization that their lives are
imperiled.30 If decision-making is truly to be a mutual
and collaborative effort, the informed consent model
requires physical and psychic rededication to equal par-
ticipation by patient and physician alike through a pro-
cess of contracting, negotiating, and recontracting. 31
Professors Katz and Capron furthermore propose
that the collaboration include the involvement of third
parties, whether they be family, other health care pro-
viders, professional organizations, government bodies,
or interested private institutions. They note that collec-
tive decision-making is particularly justifiable in the
context of catastrophic diseases. Collaboration among
these third parties "can better take into account the ben-
efits derived by individuals from public health actions,
which will affect not only the total amount which ought
optimally to be spent on catastrophic disease treatment
but also the distribution of the resulting resources
among the potential recipients." 32 More important,
such mutual decision-making ensures that diverse values
will be considered in the process. For example, the for-
mulation of the definition of death should not be within
the sole competence of the medical profession; instead
the formulation should reflect pluralistic perspectives
within society.
Another central theme of the Catastrophic Diseases
study is that responsible decision-making can be best
ensured by identifying the roles of the decision-makers
and making the process visible to the public eye. Iden-
tifying the collaborative responsibilities of patients and
physicians helps to overcome the natural tendency of
each participant to hand over total responsibility to the
other. Public identification of roles serves the additional
purpose of making the individual consciously aware of
his or her social responsibility to be thoughtful and con-
scientious.
Professors Katz and Capron accordingly suggest that
scarce medical treatments should be allocated through a
national system employing a mixture of collective stan-
dards and a lottery.3 3 They acknowledge that the open
administration of such a system:
threatens to undermine the myth of societal com-
mitment to life as a "pearl beyond price" because
the process itself shows that we as a society are
only willing to commit limited resources to certain
types of medical care or to treat only a portion of
those who suffer. Yet most people are already
aware of our collective deviation from our pro-
fessed beliefs. If the proposed system serves to re-
duce some of the obfuscation which has
surrounded this point, we find its advantages as a
method of selection more than outweigh the result-
ing loss in societal peace of mind and self-image.
34
Professors Katz and Capron recognize the pain of con-
scious awareness of a tragic reality by individuals and
society, but point out the greater costs of obscuring the
basis for decisions, including confusion, misunderstand-
ing, and abuse. Thus they insist on continually raising
the question, "Who decides what?"
Professor Katz's contribution to the field of family
law is the product of an intense collaboration with Pro-
fessors Joseph Goldstein and John Simon, and with his
students. His collaboration with Professor Goldstein led
to the creation of a casebook, The Family and the
Law. 35 That book provokes students by repeatedly pos-
ing hard questions and by requiring a dynamic interac-
tion with multidisciplinary materials. Because we are all
familiar with the tensions of family life, the descriptions
of social pathology in family relationships may often
bring forth memories of conflicts that readers have per-
sonally felt as family members. In the introduction to
the casebook, Professors Katz and Goldstein wrote:
The question underlying all of these general and
specific questions is whether, how, and to what
extent the state should not or should be authorized
to regulate the relations of man. In answering this
question the decisionmaker must resolve the im-
portant issue of why, when, and how the state
ought or ought not to intervene....
The reader who opens himself to these questions
and materials will be unable to keep his thoughts
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from straying to reflections about himself and his
family. This may cause feelings of uneasiness, par-
ticularly if the boundary between the people in the
materials and those in personal fantasy becomes
hazy. Such an experience can be likened to that of
the medical student who frequently "suffers" from
all of the symptoms he is studying in his
textbooks. "As a matter of fact, it is most unsatis-
factory to be immune to 'medical students' disease.
A touch of the ailment is a sign that the reader is
really opening himself to his subject, trying to
grasp it and feel it rather than just reading about
it."36
Professor Katz's commitment to collaboration and
candor in human relationships is not limited to his
scholarship, but is evident in his classroom and his per-
sonal relationships with students and colleagues. He has
often chosen to team-teach some of his courses in order
to ensure exposure to contrasting views of controversial
subjects, and to capture in the classroom some of the
synergism that has fueled his scholarship. He is a de-
manding professor, offering students the challenge of
collaborating with him in addressing the questions he
raises and in uncovering additional questions. Whatever
insecurity a student may feel when confronted with such
a challenge is overcome quickly, however, typically over
lunch at Mory's, on walks through campus, or over
drinks at his home. His immense success as a teacher is
reflected by the prominent presence of his former stu-
dents on law faculties nationwide. His remarkable in-
sights have led many of us to begin in-depth explora-
tions of our own capacities as family members, patients,
health practitioners, attorneys, researchers, and policy-
makers.
One theme that emerges from his diverse scholarship
and teaching is that in refusing to acknowledge and take
responsibility for choices we make, we choke our own
growth as mature individuals, and the growth of our
humanity as well. Choice is inevitable-and the terrify-
ing prospect of making choices in situations involving
human experimentation or catastrophic disease tempts
us to deny that choice exists, to hand over choice to
others. By relentlessly asking "Who decides?" Professor
Katz has illuminated the human proclivity to answer (in
effect), "Anyone but me!" The stark light that this ex-
change casts on the human predicament no doubt fos-
ters denial, but fortunately does not foreclose more con-
structive responses.
Perhaps his work ultimately leads to a single most
important question: whether we can accept responsibil-
ity for our choices. If we are to transcend the world of
the Grand Inquisitor, most tellingly represented today
by the "miracle" of modern technology and the magic
solutions it promises, we must not only answer this
question affirmatively, but begin the difficult process of
learning to take responsibility. In so doing, we can de-
rive comfort from his related message, which is that
although the burden of choice is one we each ought to
shoulder, it is also one that we can and ought to share
with others, through conversation, collaboration, and
mutual trust.
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